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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 31, 2000, Israel followed the United States' lead and signed
the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).' This was materially the
same statute that Israel had refused to sign for more than two years, despite
having been one of the most vocal and ardent supporters of the creation of the
ICC.' There were several reasons for Israel's change in position. On August
21, 2000, Alan Baker, Israel's Chief Foreign Ministry Legal Advisor,
announced that Israel was considering signing the Statute of the proposed
ICC.a Up to that point, the Palestinian Authority, a logical proponent of the
provision in the Statute that caused Israel's initial opposition," had voiced
support for the creation of the ICC5 implying a desire for Israel to become a
party to the Court.
This note will provide brief summaries of the development of the ICC and
the background of the Israeli-Palestinian situation and will then examine
Israel's potential motives for signing the treaty and predict the consequences
of the signature on the State of Israel, the Israeli people, the Palestinian
National Authority, and the peace process itself.
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See Israel Signs Onto International Criminal Court, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 31,
2000.
2 See Nomi Bar-Yaacov, In Change ofHeart, Israel Considers Signing War Crimes Treaty,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 20, 2000 (page not available).
3 See id.
" The provision noted characterizes "transfer of population" as a war crime the (U.N.
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, art. 8(2)(b)(viii) (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]). This provision could
arguably criminalize Israeli development of settlements in the West Bank, Golan Heights, and
Gaza Strip. This provision will be discussed in greater depth and detail later in this note.
5 See Statement by Yasser Areafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, Before the 53rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Agenda Item:
General Debate, Sept. 28, 1998.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND ISRAEL-BACKGROUND
In October 1946, an international congress met in Paris on the heels of the
first Nuremberg Trials for the purpose of beginning the process of adopting an
international criminal code and establishing an international criminal court.6
The modem state of Israel, created with the support of the United Nations after
the atrocities of World War II, was among the most fervent supporters of the
International Criminal Court's (ICC) creation.7 However, despite its initial
efforts and support for the ICC, Israel was not among the 120 nations (of 148
in attendance) that voted in favor of the adoption of the ICC Statute as the
ICC's governing document at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in
Rome on July 17, 1998."
The idea for the ICC came in the wake of the momentum against interna-
tional war crimes created by the international war crime tribunals in
Nuremberg and Tokyo at the end of World War IIV The United Nations
(U.N.) mandated that its Commission of International Jurists begin work on a
set of statutes for a permanent international criminal court.'0 Despite its
efforts, no statutes were agreed upon before the onset of the Cold War, which
effectively ended efforts towards the court's inception. " In 1989 Trinidad and
Tobago revived the idea of the ICC in the U.N. 2 The U.N. assigned the duty
to draft the ICC Statute to the International Law Commission, which produced
a final draft in 1994." From June 15 to July 17, 1998, 160 countries
participated in the Rome Conference on the establishment of an International
Criminal Court, with 120 voting to adopt the Statute of the ICC.'4 Israel was
one of seven countries (including the United States) that voted against the
6 See Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CCIC), Country-by Country
Ratification Status Report, http://www.iccnow.org/html/timeline (last visited Oct. 16, 2000).
7 See Ayelet Levy, Israel Rejects its Own Offspring: The International Criminal Court, 22
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 207, at 208 (1999).
a See Alejandro Teitelbaum, Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Critique,
SOCIAL JUSTICE, Dec. 22, 1999.
' See Giulio M. Gallarotti & Arik Y. Preis, Politics, international Justice, and the United
States: Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
1,4 (1999).
1o WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 8-9
(2001).
" ' See Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 9.
12 See Schabas, supra note 10, at 9.
13 Id. at 5.
14 See Bar-Yaacov, supra note 2.
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Statute." As this note will show, almost all of Israel's reasons for initially
refusing to sign stemmed from politics and international conflicts.
III. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATIONS
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians claim very long-enduring historical
ties to Jerusalem and areas in the West Bank region, as well as the rest of the
modem State of Israel. 6 The resulting dispute has produced decades of
violence, terrorism and hatred." Remarkably, in the 1990's there were
landmark negotiations between the two parties while violence subsided, with
a few notable exceptions. Both sides made significant concessions in the
process, but there was still a long way to go towards a lasting peace.
On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly approved "the
partition plan" to divide the British-occupied area in the Middle East among
Jews and Arabs. 8 Following Israel's declaration of independence and its
victory in the subsequent war waged by the armies of Arab states to prevent
the establishment of Israel, Israel controlled part of what was allocated under
the partition plan to be the projected Arab state of Palestine. 9 The remaining
portion of the land allocated to Palestine was divided between Jordan and
Egypt, following the Arab refusal to establish a Palestinian state in anything
less than all of British Palestine, which included the land allocated to Israel."
In 1967, Israel's preemptive strike against Egypt, Syria and Jordan as those
three prepared to attack Israel resulted in Israeli occupation of the Sinai
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and
the West Bank from Jordan." The Israelis withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula
in exchange for full peace with Egypt in 1979.2 Today, Israel maintains its
occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights.
's See Peter J. Richards & Michael N. Schmitt, Into Uncharted Water: The International
Criminal Court, 53 NAVAL WARC. REv. 1 (Jan. 1, 2000), available in 2000 WL 21071578. The
other five nations that voted against the Statute were China, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen.
Twenty-one countries abstained in the vote. See id.
'6 Seegenerally FRIEDMAN, infra note21. GERSHONR. KIEVAL&BERNARD REICH, ISRAEL:
LAND OF TRADITION AND CONFLICT 45 (2d ed. 1993).
" See generally id.
18 Id.
'9 See id. at 45-46.
20 See id.
2" THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM xii (1995).
2 See id. at xiii.
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IV. WHY ISRAEL INITIALLY REJECTED THE ICC STATUTE
Several factors weighed in Israel's initial decision not to endorse the ICC
Statute, including objections to the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction,' the right
of member states to withhold information and documents from the Court that
could prejudice national security interests, and the selection process forjudges
to serve on the court."' Israel's primary objection, however, was that the
relocation of Israelis to settlements in the West Bank (possibly including parts
of Jerusalem), Gaza, and the Golan Heights, areas captured by Israel in the
process of defending itself against attacks from its Arab neighbors, would be
deemed a war crime under the ICC Statute.S
However, in a dramatic turn of events, in August of 2000, under pressure
from Palestinian negotiators in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Israeli
officials acknowledged that they were considering signing the Statute.' While
Israel's subsequent signature does not signify a ratification of the statute by
Israel (ratification is another process which would require a restructuring of
Israeli laws to conform with the Statute), it does express support for the
principles underlying it.
The main reason for Israel's initial refusal to sign is an indirect result of the
unfortunate use of the Rome Conference and ultimately the ICC as a political
forum. Specifically, Israel opposed "the inclusion in the draft treaty, at the
insistence of Arab countries, of a clause implying that Jewish settlement
activity in 'occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem' was a war
crime comparable to the Nazi Holocaust and other atrocities. 2 7 Nonetheless,
the Statute provides a new international definition of the crime of "transfer of
population" including the indirect transfer of a state's "own civilian population
into the territory it occupies" within the Statute's description of "war
crimes. ' s Accordingly, Israeli settlers in the "occupied territories" could be
' Israel objected to the scope ofjurisdiction because "the Statute is both too broad and too
narrow. The Statute is too narrow because it fails to include several serious crimes, such as
airplane hijacking and biological and chemical warfare. It is too broad because the Statute
expands the scope of preexisting international law to include specific acts as war crimes that
have not before been recognized as such." Levy, supra note 7, at 209.
4 See The Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Country by Country Ratification
Status Report, at http://www.iccnow.org/html/country.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2000).
's See Levy, supra note 7, at 209.
26 Bar-Yaacov, supra note 2.
27 David H. Goldberg, Reform of United Nations Falling Short, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS,
Jan. 20, 2000, at 9.
28 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 12(3) (1998).
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charged by the ICC with war crimes.29 While some experts and politicians
believe that Israel's subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the ICC and thus to
this provision would not lead to any charges being brought against Jewish
settlers,30 the provision would at least leave the door open for such claims by
Arab countries.3 Additionally, one has to question the intention of the Arab
countries fighting for the inclusion of the provision, if not to seek prosecution
of Israeli settlers and government officials for establishing settlements in the
West Bank.3
2
The only prior prohibition of such settlements in international law is the
Fourth Geneva Convention, created in 1949 to address the protection of
civilians during international and domestic armed conflicts.33 The Geneva
Convention, from which the Statute's language was drawn, is arguably
enforceable as customary international law, which is internationally binding,
because it was an attempt to update the Hague Convention of 1907, known as
the Law of War.34 However, the Israeli High Court has not treated the Geneva
Convention as binding except for provisions specifically incorporated into
29 See Levy, supra note 7, at 209.
30 See Peter Hirschberg, BriefEncounter-Richard Goldstone, South African Judge andEx-
War Crimes Prosecutor, THE JERUSALEM REPORT, July 3, 2000, at 6 (quoting Goldstone, a
Jewish ex-chief prosecutor of the U.N. war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, responding to the question "[If Israel joins the ICC] [y]ou don't see West Bank settlers
being tried for war crimes?" with "Absolutely not. No country will want the court to lose
credibility by making political decisions.").
"' See Evelyn Gordon, Real Countries Do Not Express Support for Treaties that Declare
Their Entire Government to be War Criminals, JERUSALEM POST, June 20, 2000, at 8 (stating
"the treaty as it stands would make every member of every Israeli government, past or present,
a war criminal."). Actually, because the statute would not be retroactive, no past government
members would be "war criminals."
" It should be noted that the clashes that began in September 2000 may have a long-lasting
effect on Israel's trust of the Palestinian leadership and thus may have affected its willingness
to sign the statute before an enduring full-fledged peace treaty was reached. For instance, Israel
may have had legitimate concerns that even if negotiations continue and Israel were to sign the
statute per Palestinian requests as an act of goodwill, the Palestinian Authority may attempt to
prosecute Israel for what it alleges are war crimes if more violence breaks out in the future. The
final declaration of the October 21-22, 2000 Arab Summit expressed an intention to bring
charges in the ICC against Israeli officials and soldiers for alleged war crimes associated with
these clashes. See The Arab Summit's Closing Statement, MIDEAST MIRROR, vol. 14-204, Oct.
23, 2000 (on file with author). Such charges however cannot be brought before the ICC since
the Statute is not retroactive. REFLECTIONS ON THE INTER.NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 6
(Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999).
33 See Levy, supra note 7, at 227, 238.
34 See id. at 224.
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Israeli law.3" Accordingly, Israel could be considered under international law
to be a "persistent objector" to the Geneva Convention provision on settle-
ments, and as such, not subject to the law.36
Additionally, the provision in the Geneva Convention regarding settlements
was drafted "in response to what the Nazis had done to civilian populations
under their control--deliberately moving vast groups of people for the purpose
of destroying them."37 The applicability of the Geneva Convention thus seems
inappropriate where there was no forced deportation, racial agenda, or planned
extermination.
The U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court
defined the elements of the crime as "the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the
Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside this territory. ' 38 The Commission listed
the elements as:
1. The perpetrator: (a) Transferred, 9 directly or indirectly,
parts of its own population into the territory it occupies; or (b)
Deported or transferred all or parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside this territory. 2. The
conduct took place in the context of and was associated with
an international armed conflict. 3. The perpetrator was aware
of factual circumstances that established the existence of an
armed conflict.'°
3s See Behnan Dayanim, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Deportations of Palestinians:
The Interaction of Law and Legitimacy, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 115, 153 (1994).
36 As a persistent objector, Israel would not be bound by the custom otherwise binding on
non-objectors. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 cmt. d (1986).
31 Malvina Halberstam, Association ofAmerican Law Schools Panel on the International
Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 223, 261 (1999).
38 Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
" Footnote 44 of the Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court Addendum Final Draft Text ofthe Elements of Crimes states: "The term 'transfer' needs
to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law."
o United Nations Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Report of
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court Addendum Finalized Draft
Text ofthe Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, art. 8(2)(b)(viii) (2000)
[hereinafter Finalized Drafter Text of the Elements of Crimes].
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The phrase "directly or indirectly"' was not a part of the provision lifted from
the Geneva Convention by the drafters of the Statute, but was specifically
added in the ICC statute. This phrase presents a stronger possibility for
interpretation, and perhaps even an intention, to include Jewish settlements in
the occupied territories.
According to the Coalition for an International Criminal Court,42 "[t]he
inclusion of settlement activity as a 'war crime,' according to Israel, has no
basis in international law. The inclusion of this provision (Article 8, Paragraph
2(b), gub-para viii), Israel's most significant concern, was largely resolved
through the negotitiations [sic] on the Elements of Crimes at the U.N.
Preparatory Committee." '43 Despite the Coalition's assertion that the issue was
largely resolved, the result of the Preparatory Committee's negotiations on that
provision do not seem to indicate any substantial change in Israel's vulnerabil-
ity or its likelihood of being prosecuted under the Statute.
Contrary to the report of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court,
this definition of the elements of the crime of settlement activity does not
resolve Israel's concern. In fact, by this definition of the war crime of
settlement activity, Israel's settlements in the areas it occupied from Syria and
Jordan after the 1967 war44 would put its settlers and government officials
within the scope of the International Criminal Court's prosecution. Element
two is easily satisfied because the settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and Golan Heights are associated with an international armed conflict, namely
the 1967 war in which Israel occupied those regions.45 The third element is
also obviously satisfied because Israel was aware of the factual circumstances
that established the existence of an armed conflict, as such circumstances
included six nations declaring war on Israel. Because the term "transfer"
needs to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant provisions of
international humanitarian law (as stated in footnote 44 of the Finalized Draft
Text of the Elements of Crimes), the first element of the crime of transfer of
41 Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 12(3).
4, Coalition for an International Criminal Court is a nongovernmental organization whose
main purpose is "to advocate for the creation of an effective, just and independent International
Criminal Court." The NGO Coalition for an ICC, About the CICC (visited Nov. 15, 2000)
http://www.iccnow.orghtml/coalition.htm.
" Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Country-by-Country Ratification Status
Report (visited Nov. 15, 2000), http://www.iccnow.org/html/country.html.
4See CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 206-07 (St.
Martin's Press, 2d ed. 1992).
45 See id.
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population cannot yet be definitively analyzed." However, the "directly or
indirectly" language suggests that there is not a definition of "transfer" that
could exclude Israeli settlement activity.
The politics that dominated the Rome Conference, and that initially
prevented Israel from supporting the Statute that it felt was desperately
needed, prevailed again at the six meetings of the Committees of the
Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court,47 despite urging
from the Indonesian representative at the Sixth Committee meeting to "make
sure that the ICC does not become a mechanism established simply to be used
for interfering in the internal affairs of a State. '
The Israeli representative at the Sixth Committee, Esther Efrat-Smilg,
questioned whether the " 'crime of transfer' [of population] really ranked
among the most heinous and,serious of war crimes," stating that the Statute's
"key elements should be defined on the basis of the established framework of
international law and not the political wishes of specific States.' 9 Responses
to Efrat-Smilg alluding to specific claims of Israeli war crimes in the
establishment of settlements ensued from the Syrian representative"° and the
Lebanese representative.51 According to one despondent U.S. journalist, "the
ICC will soon be a forum for the airing of conflicting national and political
agendas, and, not to forget, historical grievances."5
46 See Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, supra note 40.
4 Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference, which established the Preparatory
Commission, listed the duties to be carried out by the Commission:
The Commission shall prepare proposals for practical arrangements for the
establishment and coming into operation of the Court, including the draft
texts of: (a) Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) Elements of Crimes; (c)
A relationship agreement between the Court and the United Nations; (d)
Basic principles governing a headquarters agreement to be negotiated
between the Court and the host country; (e) Financial regulations and
rules...
Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/10*
(1998).
48 M2 Presswire, Oct. 28, 1999, available at 1999 WL 24365203.
49 Id.
so See id. (stating that "crimes were being committed daily in the occupied Syrian Golan and
in the Palestinian lands," but insisting that "there was no connection between the discussions in
this Committee and the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, which had been delayed
because of the stubbornness of Israel.").
"' See id. (stating that "Israeli occupation had created countless victims" and stressing "the
importance of having a legally acceptable definition of the crime of aggression and of the
elements of the crime of transfer of population.").2 Helle Bering, International Criminal Circus; Political Correctness Runs Amok Again,
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In addition to Israel's objections to certain crimes included in the Statute,
Israel objected to the exclusion of certain crimes from the Statute.53 This
objection was particularly powerful considering the omitted crimes that are far
more heinous than Israel's alleged "transfer of population" crimes, including
airplane hijacking and biological and chemical warfare.' According to Law
Professor Leila Sadat Wexler of Washington University, who was present at
the Rome Conference, many crimes were not included because of"trade-offs"
made by negotiating countries."
However, the trade-off offered to Israel would criminalize many of its
citizens while far more heinous crimes including some acts of terrorism that
have previously been aimed at Israel would not be subject to prosecution.
Additionally, because ofa provision of the Statute that prevents countries from
accepting the Statute while maintaining reservations,m Israel may not, by the
strict letter of the Statute, show its support for the balance of the Statute while
excepting to the "transfer of population" provision.57 Despite the restriction
in the Rome Statute, Israel's signature of the Statute includes a writing which
resembles a reservation:
the government of the State of Israel signs the statue [sic]
while rejecting any attempt to interpret provisions thereof in
a politically motivated manner against Israel and its citizens.
The government of Israel hopes that Israel's expressions of
concern over any such attempt would be recorded in history
as warning against the risk of politicization, that might
undermine the objectives of what is intended to become a
central impartial body, benefiting mankind as a whole."
This reservation, however, may not be given full legal weight because of
the anti-reservation provision in the Rome Statute and because of international
law regarding reservations. The legal effect of this purported reservation will
be discussed later in this note.
WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 2000, at A19.
" See Levy, supra note 7, at 209.
54 See id.
" Leila Sadat Wexler, Association of American Law Schools Panel on the International
Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 223, 261 (1999).
56 Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 120.
57 See id. at arts. 5(1)(d), 5(2).
58 Herb Keinon, FM Advisor Baker: 'Initialed agreement does not Commit Israel,'
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 4, 2001, at 2, available at 2001 WL 6600645.
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Another aspect of the ICC that works against Israel is the process for the
selection ofjudges 9 One of the criteria for selection of judges is "equitable
geographic representation."' Previous international judicial elections have
proven that this type of system does not bode well for the possibility of an
Israeli judge being elected.6'
V. U.S. REJECTION OF THE STATUTE
The United States also initially refused to endorse the Statute62 before
President Bill Clinton finally decided to sign on the deadline date of December
31, 2000.63 Before signing, the United States was concerned that the treaty
may render American military personnel vulnerable to politically-motivated
criminal charges by countries that wish to "settle scores" with America in
cases where U.S. peace-keeping or policing forces were used." U.S.
reluctance to join may have been moot, because the primary subject of U.S.
criticism of the Statute is its subjecting nationals of non-party states to the
ICC' sjurisdiction where the state in whose territory the alleged crime occurred
is a member-state. 65 Under this provision, Americans who may be charged
with crimes under the ICC Statute would be subject to the jurisdiction of the
ICC anytime they were on the soil of a party country.
This provision is seen by many in Washington as a serious threat to state
sovereignty, and ratification by the Senate appears unlikely to come anytime
soon." The signing was criticized by Clinton's Defense Secretary Bill
Cohen,67 then President-elect George W. Bush, Bush's Defense Secretary-
Designate Donald Rumsfeld, and Senator Jesse Helms." Helms went on to say
that he will never allow the treaty to be ratified.69
59 See Levy, supra note 7, at 247.
60 Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 36(8Xa)(ii).
6' See Levy, supra note 7, at 247.
CCIC, supra note 6.
63 See Laura Peek, US Signs Up to War Crimes Tribunal, TIMES OF LONDON, Jan. 1,2001.
6 See Gordon, supra note 31.
61 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489,490 (1999).
" See Steven Lee Myers, US. Signs Treaty that Establishes World Court Outgoing Clinton
Defies Pentagon, GOP Senators, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 1,2001, at Al.
67 See Disputed Treaty Trying War Criminals vs. National Security, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Jan. 8, 2001, at B6.
" See Myers, supra note 66; Holger Jensen, Don't Expect to See Court on War Crimes Very
Soon, DESERETNEWS, Jan. 7,2001, at AA08.
"See id.
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President Clinton, however, defended his decision to sign the treaty
stating, "... we are not abandoning our concerns about significant flaws in the
Treaty... [w]ith signature, however, we will be in position to influence the
evolution of the Court. Without signature, we will not."70 The point made by
Clinton is very valid. According to Clinton, the Statute is flawed because it
gives the court the power to exercise jurisdiction over personnel of non-
signatory nations.7 Therefore, it is logical to sign the treaty since it will likely
affect Americans anyway, and by signing, the U.S. will be involved in the
early development of the court and may be able to influence the court in a way
that will work out its flaws. Obviously, this rationale is logical to Israel's
position as well.
VI. ISRAEL'S POSSIBLE MOTIVES IN JOINING THE COURT
It should be pointed out that for the people of Israel, who have a deeply
rooted interest in punishing human rights violations, rejecting the court was an
unnatural and undesirable position. As noted above, Israel was instrumental
in the initial stages of the formation of the ICC. Additionally, the Israeli
Supreme Court was the first to invoke and apply another international human
rights treaty, the Genocide Convention, in its trial of Nazi war criminal Adolph
Eichmann.72 That case was the first instance where a national court supported
the principle of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals.73 As one
senior Israeli government source said, "[flor Israel, as the country of the
Jewish people, to refrain from signing a treaty against war crimes, cannot be
understood in the world and is even perceived as a moral deficiency."' 4 The
Jewish people have been victims of human rights violations many times in
recorded history, the most recent and atrocious being the Holocaust, which
arguably prompted the initial idea of the ICC itself." This close tie between
the Jewish state and international human rights law is the factor that made it
so difficult for Israel to refuse to sign the Statute from the beginning.
70 Clinton Statement on Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 1, 2001.
71 See id.
72 See Irwin Cotder, Support the International Criminal Court, JERUSALEM POsT, Dec. 31,
2000, at 6.
71 See id.
7" Aluf Benn, Cabinet to decide on International Court [T7reaty, HA'ARETZ DAILY
NEWS--ENGLISH INTERNET EDITION, Dec. 31,2000 (page not available) http://www3.haaretz.co.
il/eng/scriptsfarticle.asp?id= 05 152&wordld=International+Crimi... 10.
"5 See Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 9.
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Unfortunately, political considerations complicated Israel's support for the
ICC.
VII. EFFECT OF THE SEPTEMBER, 2000 OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE ON
ISRAEL'S DECISION
The current armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people has
also complicated Israel's position in regard to the ICC. Before current conflict
began, Israel and the Palestinians were making unprecedented progress
towards peace. Such peace would eventually have made moot the issue of the
territories that are allegedly illegally occupied in areas that Palestinians claim
should be under sovereign Palestinian rule. Considering the situation at the
time that Israel signed, which was at best cessation and at worst abandonment
of the peace process, there seemed to be little or no reason to make joining the
ICC a priority for the Israeli government unless and until the Statute is
redrafted to remove the possibility that their settlement activity could be
prosecuted. However, because the deadline for signing the Statute without
ratification was December 31, 2000, Israel was forced to make a decision to
either alienate itself from the international community or to sign a treaty that
could potentially leave Israeli leaders indictable before the court that the treaty
created.
The pressure of the decision faced by the Israeli Cabinet as the deadline
approached was increased by the tremendous amount of scrutiny on Israel by
the international community concerning the Al-Aqsa Intifadah and Israel's
response. Some members of the international community might have
questioned Israel's dedication to human rights in the wake of media reports
depicting alleged atrocities by Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians. 6
Thus the international press put added pressure on Israel to sign the Statute.
VIII. ISRAELI POLITICS AND THE DECISION TO SIGN
Another factor Israeli leaders had to consider was the domestic political
reaction to a signature of the Statute. A June 2000 editorial in the Jerusalem
76 Footage played on television news broadcasts worldwide showing the Israeli army
allegedly using tear gas, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition against Palestinian civilians
and children, most of whom were armed only with rocks. One clip even showed a 12-year-old
Palestinian boy and his father cowering in fear behind a metal barrier as a gun battle between
Israeli forces and Palestinians ensued above and around them. 12-year-old boy among dead in
Israeli-Palestinian crossfire, http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/09/30/israel.palestinian.
victims.ap/ (visited Oct. 1, 2000).
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Post proclaimed that "[n]ational self-respect... [hit] a new low last week with
[Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin's] proposal that Israel sign" the Statute."
Due to the violent clashes with Palestinians, public support for the peace
process itself was wavering. 7 Accordingly, it was very difficult politically for
an Israeli government to have the support of the nation in signing the Statute
before the end of the current violence. This political pressure was heightened
by the election for prime-minister between the Dovish Barak and the hawkish
Sharon only months after the December 31 deadline.79
Israel's signing of the Statute still leaves speculation concerning Israel's
intentions. As is apparent from the retreat from the negotiating tables by both
sides, questions still abound as to the dedication of both parties to a lasting
peace considering the sacrifices that each side would be forced to make.
Either Israel intends to be bound by the Statute in a manner consistent with
what the Arab states intended at the Rome Conference, or it may see a way
around its actions being indictable under the Statute.
The Israeli signature could mean, as the concession would appear on its
face, that Israel is agreeing to stop building settlements in the occupied areas
of the West Bank region, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, and to stop all growth
of the current settlements. However, the included areas would still be in
dispute as there is not agreement as to whether Jerusalem is included in these
areas. Jerusalem would likely be included in the Palestinian view but certainly
not in the Israeli view. The Palestinian Authority "consider[s] Jerusalem the
capital of [their] prospective Palestinian state, the center of [their] society and
the heart of [their] history and culture" and considers Israel "a belligerent
occupant."80 Israel has considered Jerusalem its official capital since the
Knesset passed a "Basic Law" on Jerusalem on July 30, 1980, which stated
that "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel."'" It is unwilling
to negotiate any withdrawal from any part of Jerusalem as part of the peace
" Gordon, supra note 3 1.
See Hugh Dellios, Israelis Disillusioned With Barak, Treaty; Many are no Longer Certain
They Want a Peace Deal, Cli. TRIB., Dec. 31, 2000, at 4.
79 See id.
go Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Jerusalem, Our Capital: Jerusalem: Its
Legal Status and the Possibility ofa Durable Settlement (last visited Nov. 13,2000) http://www.
pna.net/jerusalem/alhaq-jerusalem.htm.
S1 Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 1980, S.H. 980, available at http://www.israel.
org/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00hf0.
2002]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
process.82 It is this direct conflict of views on which neither side seems willing
to budge that may make any other negotiations moot.
Even if the two sides somehow reach an agreement, another region in
Israel, the Golan Heights in the North along the Syrian border, is considered
"occupied" under the Statute and thus, may render Israeli officials and
nationals prosecutable under the Statute. The Golan region is vital to Israeli
security" and negotiations with Syria are not as advanced as those with the
Palestinians. In fact, while Israel might hope that the settlement dispute with
the Palestinians will be solved before it ever reaches the ICC, it is very
unlikely that peace will be achieved with Syria before the ratification of the
Statute by sixty nations, which would activate the court.
This puts Israel in a situation similar to the one President Clinton described.
The Israeli situation is complicated by the two clauses in the Statute-one that
may criminalize the settlement activities and the other that allows nationals of
non-signatory nations to be prosecuted if they commit a violation of the
Statute on the ground of a signatory nation. If the settlements in the Golan are
illegal under the Statute, then they are technically on Syrian ground. Because
Syria is a signatory of the Statute," Israeli nationals who live there may be
subject to prosecution whether or not Israel signs the Statute. Therefore, like
Clinton's analysis, it was arguably in Israel's best interest to sign the Statute
and try to change it as a signatory member of the ICC, instead of waiting for
sixty countries to ratify it and then having no say in the development of the
court.
IX. POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST PROSECUTION
There are reasons for Israel to believe that there will not be any ICC
prosecution of supposed war crimes for a number of years. Israel may be
assuming that by the time the Statute is ratified, there will be a permanent
peace in place with the Palestinians and there will be no more "occupied"
lands or new settlements (or that if there is not such a peace, the issue will
have been settled by conflict).
Another concern of the Israeli delegation to the Rome Conference was that
the crime of "aggression" might be defined according to political desires of the
82 See Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem: The Legal and Political Background, JUSTICE, Vol. 3
(Autumn 1994).
83 See Reich & Kieval, supra note 16, at 146.
u Syria signed the ICC Statute on November 29, 2000. See CICC Country-by-Country
Ratification Status Report (visited Dec. 11, 2000) http://www.iccnow.org/html/country.html.
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Arab nations voting together in the interests of the PLO. Several accusations
have been made by Arab countries and the PLO to suggest that Israel has
violated other international laws that would fall under "aggression. 8 5
However, there was not an agreement at the Rome Conference on the
definition of the crime "aggression." It was suggested that the Statute use the
same definition that the Organization of American States adopted in 1975 in
connection with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which it
took from the definition adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1974.86
Ironically, that definition was later rejected at the Rome Conference for being
too political.8 7 Therefore, that crime will not be under the court's jurisdiction
until a provision is adopted defining the crime and setting out the rules of the
court's jurisdiction."'
The Israeli signature could mean that Israel simply does not believe that its
construction and development of settlements are criminal, even under the ICC
Statute's language on "transfer of population." This could only lead to further
disputes. While it is unlikely that the officials that were behind Israel's
signing the treaty have this in mind, the officials that may be in office when
the issue is next raised may have different ideas.
It is also possible that, like the Rome Conference, the ICC may be operated
primarily by political motives and that Israel believes that these politics will
protect it from being charged with war crimes or will determine the verdict.
The U.N. Security Council has considerable control over who is prosecuted. 9
Accordingly, even if allegations were made by an Arab (or non-Arab) member
country against Israeli settlers or government officials in connection with
settlement activity, Israel might be able to rely on the United States to protect
85 See generally Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War: Does the Phrase "Lest
We Forget" Apply to Israeli War Criminals?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 903 (1996); Louis
Rene Beres, Israel's Freeing of Terrorists is Contrary to International Law, 73 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV 1 (1995); John Quigley, Israel's Forty-five Year Emergency: Are There Time Limits to
Derogations from Human Rights Obligations?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491 (1994); Allison M.
Fahrenkopf, A Legal Analysis of Israel's Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125 (1990); The Arag Summit's Closing Statement, MIDEAST
MIRROR, Oct. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 6443496 (2000).
86 See Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 107.
87 See Id.
88 See id.
89 Article 16 of the Statute, entitled "Deferral of investigation or prosecution" establishes
that: "No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute
for a period of 12 months after the Security Council ... has requested the Court to that effect;
that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions." Rome Statute, supra
note 4, at art. 16.
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it politically. Pursuant to the above provision, the United States, as a member
of the Security Council, could request that any prosecution or investigation of
any alleged crime be delayed for twelve months. Such a delay could last
indefinitely should the United States chose to renew such a request every
twelve months.
X. CONNECTION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI SIGNATURES
Israel's decision to sign the treaty was clearly a result of the U.S. decision
to sign earlier in the day on December 31, 2000.90 On the same day that the
United States signed the treaty, the Israeli cabinet voted seven to four against
joining the treaty.9' However, the cabinet left an escape route for signing the
treaty, deciding that should the United States sign at the last minute, Israel
would re-assess its position and align with the U.S. 92 This scenario came to
fruition as Clinton decided to sign earlier on December 31, and Israel signed
later that day.93 The office of Prime Minister Barak said Israel had changed
its stance following "contacts at the highest level with the United States to
assure the protection of Israeli interests" which provided "clarity that.., such
signature will not harm its interests."94
An Arabic newspaper in the United Kingdom suggested that Israel may be
relying on its allies, and specifically the United States, to ensure that it is not
prosecuted for settlement activity." The article suggests that
[i]t may therefore be right to ask whether Israel's signing of
the treaty was accompanied by hidden 'guarantees' that the
court would not address many of its practices that violate
human rights along the lines of the alleged 'solemn guaran-
tees' demanded by the US Department of Defense to the
effect that no US soldier or government employee will be
convicted by the court.9
90 See Israel Decides to Sign International Criminal Court Charter After US Does, BBC
MoNITORING, Jan. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2307725.
9' See id.
9 See id.
93 See id.
9 Israel Signs onto International Criminal Court, supra note 1.
9' UKArabic Paper Views Israel's Signing oflnternational Criminal Court Treaty, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, Jan. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5020852.
96 Id.
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The article goes on to say that "those Arabs who support the treaty will also
be hoping that the court will be dispensing the justice in a way that there are
no 'exceptions.' ""
Concerns about politicization of the court on the part of those who would
like to see the Israelis prosecuted are likely justified. It would be hypocritical,
but not inconceivable, for Israel to use politics as a shield in the very court
where it complained that politics were allowing the court to be used as a
sword. In fact, the statement from Prime Minister Barak's office indicatesjust
such a political maneuver, as does a statement from Israeli Cabinet Secretary
Isaac Herzog stating that Israel signed the treaty after coordinating its position
with the United States, and ensured that Israel's interests will not be damaged
by its becoming a member of the court."
There is also another reason that the Israeli signature might not mean as
much as it seems. Article 124 of the Statute provides that:
a state, on becoming a party to this statute, may declare that,
for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this
Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdic-
tion of the Court with respect to Article 8 [war crimes] when
a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or
on its territory."
Accordingly, if Israel does ratify the Statute, it could request a seven year
immunity from prosecution from the time ofratification. This would buy even
more time to establish a lasting peace with a provision on the part of the
Palestinian Authority to agree not to pursue a prosecution of Israeli nationals
for the crime of "transfer of population." It would also give the Israelis seven
more years to populate settlements before anyone would be subject to
prosecution because of the non-retroactivity clause in the Statute. Article 123
provides that seven years after ratification and entry into force of the statute,
a review of the Statute may be conducted and the Statute may be amended."°
Therefore, it is also possible that the "transfer of population" law in the Statute
could be amended before Israeli nationals could even be prosecuted.
It is important to note that Israel's signature of the Statute does not legally
bind Israel under the court's jurisdiction when the court becomes
97 id.
9' See BBC MONITORING, supra note 90.
" Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 124.
'oo See id. at art. 123.
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operational.' 0 ' The signature, as pointed out by Israeli Foreign Ministry legal
advisor Alan Baker, is only an authorization of the content of its text. 2
According to Baker, "[flrom a domestic legal point of view in Israel, such an
important agreement, especially if it involves transfer of territories, has to
receive approval by the Knesset, and in some cases-though the legislation has
not been completed yet-also has to go to a referendum."'
01 3
XI. DECISION TO SIGN WAS THE BEST POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL
Considering all of the factors that Israel faced in its decision and despite all
of the political problems and possible repercussions, signing the ICC Statute
was the best decision for Israel. The December 31, 2000, deadline forced
Israel to make a decision that would affect several aspects of its internal
politics, international image, regional relations, and even its territorial
integrity. Prime Minister Barak likely saw the December 31 deadline, as did
President Clinton, as an opportunity to establish a legacy and to point his
nation towards peace.
The move was logically and strategically sound for the State of Israel as
well. The provision in the Statute that may render Israeli settlements on
occupied land illegal affects not only government officials who made policy
decisions to establish and develop these settlements, but also the 200,000
Israelis living on the 145 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.'0
However, Israel's signing of the Statute may not have any effect on whether
those Israeli nationals will be charged.
One of the bases of jurisdiction that the court is allowed under the Statute
is jurisdiction where a crime is committed on the territory of a state party. 0 5
Accordingly, had Israel not signed the Statute and whether or not Israel ratifies
the Statute, Israeli nationals may be subject to prosecution because the
settlements are alleged to be on Syrian or Palestinian land. Since Syria is a
signatory state of the ICC,' ° and the alleged crimes occurred on what may be
considered Syrian land, the crimes are subject to prosecution under the ICC
Statute. This is so even if Israel were not a signatory state or if Israel does not
10. See Keinon, supra note 58, at 2.
'02 See id. at 1.
103 Id.
'04 See Israel, U.S. Sign Treaty to Create an International Criminal Court, TORONTO STAR,
Jan. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4020264.
105 See Schabas, supra note 10, at 62.
"06 Syria signed the ICC Statute on November 29, 2000. See CICC Country-by-Country
Ratification Status Report, http://www.iccnow.org/html/country.htnl (visited Dec. 11, 2000).
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ratify the Statute. The same is true of the Palestinian Authority, which is
likely to ratify the Statute if and when it gains statehood. 07 Further, even
without the ICC Statute, some Israeli nationals could still be indictable under
the "Pinochet Doctrine," which makes former heads of state and other senior
officials accountable for international crimes, based on the principle of
universal jurisdiction.' 8
XII. POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI RATIFICATION OF THE ICC STATUTE
Israel's Basic Law provides that "there shall be no deprivation or restriction
of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.""
This provision is contrary to the ICC Statute and thus would have to be
amended or repealed before the Knesset could vote to ratify the Statute. The
Israeli Basic Law also provides the President immunity from prosecution by
any court or tribunal in connection with any act connected with his functions
or powers."o In addition, the Israeli Basic Law protects members of Israel's
Knesset from some prosecutions."'
The Knesset will have to determine whether or not these provisions can
remain in harmony with the ICC Statute before it can ratify the Statute.
Because ICC member states will have to sacrifice an element of sovereignty,
it is likely that these provisions will have to be amended to exclude ICC
Proceedings. This is different from the temporary international courts created
by the United Nations. These courts are currently in operation to deal with
specific situations. 2 because the member states are voluntary members and
thus submit voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court. When the time comes
for the Knesset to seriously evaluate ratification, it will likely have to amend
107 See Statement by Yasser Arafat before the 53rd Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, Agenda Item: General Debate, September 28, 1998, http://www.palestine-
un.org/mission/3a.53.html (stating "we welcome the creation of the International Criminal
Court, which is considered to be an important step towards the enhancement of the law and
towards bringing an end to the atrocities and crimes being committed against humanity.").
108 See Cotler, supra note 72, at 6.
'09 ISRAELI BASIC LAW, art. 5.
"0 ISRAELI BASIC LAW, art. 13-14.
. A provision ofthe Basic Law provides members of the Knesset immunity that ensures that
a Knesset Member cannot bear criminal responsibilities for any act which he or she performed
while fulfilling his or her duty or in order to fulfill his or her duty. ISRAELI BASIC LAW art. 5.
112 The United Nations currently has two temporary war crimes courts in operation. Peek,
supra note 63. One was created to charge those suspected of war crimes in connection with the
Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war of the early 1990s, and the other deals with officials implicated
in atrocitites committed during unrest in Rwanda in 1994. Id.
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these provisions. Israel supports the idea of the ICC and in order to do so must
acknowledge the sacrifice of sovereignty that comes with member status.
Therefore, will likely make those amendments and changes to laws as are
necessary to comply with the Statute and ratify it so long as the settlement
activity is not prosecutable.
Additionally, at a meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the ICC in
June 2000, a footnote was inserted to the effect that the definition of transfer
in the "occupied territories provision" would be that which is in accordance
with international humanitarian law."' Even though the Statute was not
directly amended to exclude the "directly or indirectly" language, this footnote
would seem to imply that the Statute does not purport to modify existing
international law, only to enforce it. While this does not definitively exclude
Israel's settlement activity in the occupied territories from offenses subject to
prosecution, it certainly shifts the law in Israel's favor.
XIII. EFFECT OF ISRAEL'S SIGNING ON THE ISRAELI SETTLERS,
OFFICIALS, AND THE STATE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
The Israeli signing of the Statute probably had little to no effect on the
prospects of possible criminal allegations being charged in connection with the
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. As noted above, a provision of
the Statute may grant the court jurisdiction over settlement activity because it
may be argued that the settlements are actually on Syrian, Jordanian, or
Palestinian land. Thus, they are subject to ICC jurisdiction because Syria and
Jordan are signatory states, and the future Palestinian state, if and when it
becomes a state, will be likely to join the ICC as well.
If anything, Israel's signing of the Statute will decrease the chances of any
charges being filed. As a signatory state, Israel will be able to participate in
the development of the ICC process. This may include proposing and
supporting amendments to the Statute over the course of the seven years
immediately following the ratification of the Statute, during which Israel may
opt out of the court's jurisdiction, as noted above. Additionally, Israel may
take advantage of its ability to participate in other aspects of ICC procedure,
including the choice of prosecutors and composition of the court, in a manner
that will best serve its interests. Further, as noted previously in this note, t 4
Israel's signing provided it an opportunity to include a writing with
"' See Cotler, supra note 72, at 6.
11 See Why Israel Initially Rejected the ICC statute, supra at 596.
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reservation-like language prior to ratification of the Rome Statute. The legal
weight of this writing, however, is not certain.
According to the International Court of Justice, a general proposition of
international law provides that "no reservation was valid unless it was
accepted by all the contracting parties without exception, as would have been
the case if it had been stated during the negotiations.".. 5 Clearly, Israel's
purported reservation would not have been, and in fact was not, accepted by
all contracting parties at the Rome Conference. Therefore, by this tenet of
international law, the reservation is invalid.
However, in the same case in which the International Court of Justice
articulated the acceptance principle above, it also noted that in some cases
involving international conventions, "it is proper to refer to a variety of
circumstances which would lead to a more flexible application of this
principle." " 6 Specifically, the Court was grappling with reservations made by
several states to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. 7 The Court determined that among the factors that
should be considered in determining whether to accept reservations of states
to multilateral conventions are the object and purpose of the convention itself.
In its subsequent analysis, the Court stated:
The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply
that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the
States which adopted it that as many States as possible should
participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of
one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its
application, but would detract from the authority of the moral
and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is incon-
ceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that
an objection to a minor reservation should produce such a
result. But even less could the contracting parties have
intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in
favour of a vain desire to secure as many participants as
possible. The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit
both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting
to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation
'" Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 [hereinafter Reservations to the Genocide Convention].
116 Id. at 22.
'" 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
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with the object and purpose of the Convention that must
furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the
reservation on accession as well as-for the appraisal by a State
in objecting to the reservation."'
The Statute's prohibition on reservations presents an additional obstacle to
the acceptance of Israel's accompanying writing. A report of the U.S.
Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
described the necessity, in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, of a clause not allowing any reservations at all, stating:
Since the Convention is an overall 'package deal' reflecting
different priorities of different states, to permit reservations
would inevitably permit one State to eliminate the "quid" of
another State's "quo". Thus there was general agreement in
the Conference that in principle reservations could not be
permitted. 19
Similarly, the International Criminal Court is a "package deal." The Rome
Statute reflects different priorities of different states in a manner that could
render some reservations unfair to the rest of the member States and contrary
to the nature of the court, which requires equal treatment for all member
States. This would indicate that reservations would be contrary to the spirit of
the Statute and should be forbidden. However, the Israeli statement is
arguably more of a warning against the misuse of the Court for political
purposes rather than an explicit reservation such as one proscribing prosecu-
tion of Israeli nationals under the settlement provision of the Statute.
Finally, it is unlikely that Israel will still have an occupying presence in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip at the end of Israel's seven years of immunity,
despite Yasser Arafat's rejection of Prime Minister Barak's July 2000 offer at
Camp David that would have given the Palestinians about 95% of the West
Bank and all of the Gaza Strip for a Palestinian state.
21
B Reservations on the Genocide Convention, supra note 115, at 24.
"' REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 83 (Nordqust & Park eds., 1983).
120 See Uri Dan, Israelis Blame Arafat as Hopes for Peace Deal Dim, N.Y. POST, July 18,
2000, at 2.
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XIV. FINAL ANALYSIS: THE OUTLOOK FOR ISRAEL
A final analysis suggests that there are various mechanisms that would at
least postpone a prosecution of Israeli nationals for settlement activities.
These mechanisms include the Statute's seven-year immunity provision
following notification, and the U.N. Security Council's postponement power
over the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Additionally, it is likely that
Israeli officials and liaisons to the court will try to amend the Statute's
provision on settlement activity or seek to gain support for the removal of the
provision. However, barring a resolution to the settlement issue before the end
of such postponements, the outlook is not very positive for Israeli nationals
who may be brought to trial before the International Criminal Court.
However, this is not to say that Israel's leadership made a bad decision in
signing the Statute. The December 31, 2000 deadline posed for Israel's
government a dilemma with many pros and cons to both signing and rejecting
the Statute. Internal political pressure raged from both sides, and international
pressure was present as well, most of which encouraged Israel to sign. The Al-
Aqsa Intifada and the situation it created between the Israeli and Palestinian
people and governments brought about additional international pressure and
image problems for Israel. The international press coverage of the ongoing
violence created an arguably unjustified image of Israel as the aggressor in
violation of humanitarian values, all of which would have been aggravated
further had Israel rejected the Statute. The signing of the Statute by the United
States, despite political pressure not to do so, further encouraged Israel's
endorsement. History will eventually portray Israel's decision as a good one,
a bad one, or even a rather meaningless one. The only safe predictions are that
the volatility of the Middle East, the quest for peace, the ICC party states, and
the ICC itself will all figure prominently in how the issues unfold, and that
political factors will probably prove as influential as any statutory language or
treaty provision in the court's future actions concerning Israel.
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